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The first part of this paper examines the behaviour of rupiah over the 
last eight years (1995 - 2003) to ascertain whether in fact there is 
specific evidence of a return to de facto US dollar peg in Indonesia. 
While we fail to find strong evidence to suggest Indonesia has 
reverted to the extent of dollar pegging that was undertaken pre-crisis, 
there are indications that the fluctuations of the US dollar have 
increasingly influenced the movements of rupiah, especially since 
2000. Given the apparent gradual tendency towards a “hardening” of 
the exchange rate, there is consequently an increasing need to 
maintain a sizeable level of international reserves to support the peg. 
The next question that arises naturally from this is whether there is 
any way in which the benefits from holding reserves may be obtained 
without the need for Indonesia to continue to accumulate them. This is 
where a regional reserve pooling arrangement becomes relevant. But 
how might one judge the potential size of benefits of reserve pooling? 
This is the focus of the second part of the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
The appropriate exchange rate regime for economies in East Asia continues 
to be a hotly debated subject in the aftermath of the regional financial debacle of 
1997-98 (Cavoli and Rajan, 2003 and Rajan, 2002). The three East Asian economies 
most afflicted by the crisis, viz. Indonesia, Thailand and Korea, all became official 
“floaters” since 1998 (Table 1). Nonetheless, there remain significant doubts as to 
their de facto exchange rate policies. In the specific instance of Indonesia, a new 
central bank law enacted in 1999 clearly prescribes the stabilisation of rupiah’s value 
as the sole objective of Bank Indonesia. However, this Law has been subject to 
various interpretations. For instance, on the one hand, the objective of a “stable 
rupiah” could refer to its value against the US dollar or some other benchmark (such 
as the SDR, yen, or basket of currencies).
1 On the other hand, the objective could 
refer to domestic price stability which is effectively an “inflation targeting” regime. 
Indeed, the new Law in Indonesia has explicitly granted the central bank full authority 
to decide upon the inflation target to be achieved (goal independence) and freedom 
of choice over various monetary instruments to achieve the target (instrument 
independence)
2.  
Alamsyah et. al (2001) see no contradictions between the two alternative 
interpretations of the new Law. As they note, “(t)he distinction between these two 
interpretations, and any attributed  ambiguity, may be overstated, however. In 
practice, exchange rate and price stability are usually closely correlated (p.314)”
3. 
Indeed, Siregar and Rajaguru (2002) find fluctuations of the Indonesian rupiah to 
                                                 
1  McLeod (2003) raises similar questions on the vagueness of the policy objectives of the 
new Central Bank Law (no. 23/1999). 
  
2 McLeod (2001) offers a useful discussion of Indonesia’s inflation target regime and 
questions its credibility. 
 
3 For analytical discussions of the nexus between inflation targets and the exchange rate 
regime in emerging economies and East Asia in particular, see Eichengreen (2001) and 
Cavoli and Rajan (2003), respectively.  
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have significant pass through effects on domestic prices.
4 However, the critical point 
remains as to whether the de facto exchange rate policy involves explicit currency 
targeting as a goal in and of itself, or as a means to achieving the inflation target (i.e. 
“flexible inflation target”). Statements by some senior Indonesian government officials 
appear to confuse more than clarify.
5  
But what do the data reveal? The next section carefully examines the 
behaviour of the rupiah over the last eight years (1995 - 2003) to ascertain whether 
there has been a return to de facto US dollar pegging in Indonesia. To preview the 
main conclusion, we fail to find strong evidence to suggest Indonesia has reverted to 
the extent of dollar pegging that was undertaken pre-crisis. Nonetheless, our test 
results indicate that the fluctuations of the US dollar have increasingly influenced the 
movements of rupiah, especially since 2000. Our estimates of the volatility of rupiah 
against the US dollar have shown a feasible declining trend since January 2001. 
Obviously, a more stable rupiah against the US dollar can either due to the less 
market pressures in the foreign exchange market or to the policy preference of the 
monetary authority.  Looking at the reported size of Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI) 
outstanding for rupiah intervention, clearly there is strong evidence that the monetary 
authority has been active in managing the fluctuations of the rupiah. By the end of 
1999 the size of Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI) outstanding for rupiah intervention 
increased around seven fold from its level in 1997 and has remained extremely large 
since then (Table 2). 
                                                 
4 Siregar and Rajaguru (2002) find that both rupiah volatilities (against the US dollar, the yen 
and the nominal effective exchange rate) and the rapid growth of base money have 
significantly fueled the high inflation rates during the post-1997 crisis. The study in particular 
underscores the role of loose monetary policy, reflected by periods of high growths of base 
money, as the most significant factor in explaining the rapid rise in the price level in Indonesia 
during that period.  
 
5 For instance, see “Indonesian VP Suggests Managed Float of Rupiah” by Agence France-
Presse (www.inq7.net). The National Development Planning Minister, Kwik Kian Gie, had 
instead proposed a fixed exchange rate regime to manage the volatile rupiah. The former 
governor of Bank Indonesia, Syahril Sabirin, has also expressed the bank’s commitment to do 
everything in its power to prevent the rupiah from sliding even further (the JAKARTA POST, 
23/9/01, and Siregar (2001)). 
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Another evidence points toward the presence of policy intervention in keeping 
a relatively stable rupiah, particularly against the US dollar, is the recent 
accumulation of international reserves. Indonesia’s average exchange reserve 
position has increased pointedly in recent years as the country has sought to 
stockpile reserves since they were run down in 1997-98 (Table 3). The willingness of 
Indonesia to rapidly accumulate reserves despite their high fiscal costs (as reserve 
accumulation involves foregone domestic investments) is further evidence of the 
possible acute “fear of floating” that seems to have afflicted so many emerging 
economies (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
We are certainly aware that reserves serve another purpose, viz. to enhance 
the country’s overall liquidity position and as a financial safeguard against capital 
account crises (Bird and Rajan, 2002a, 2003, and Rajan and Siregar, 2003). 
However, recent experiences of both developed and emerging markets, a 
combination of high accumulations and fluctuations of international reserves with a 
stable local currency against a particular major global currency, usually the US dollar, 
provides strong evidences of the policy preference of the monetary authority toward a 
rigid exchange rate policy (Weymark (1995), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
and Calvo and Reinhart (2002)).  Similarly for Indonesia, the recent trends on the 
reserves and rupiah, together with the mentioned statements by government officials, 
provides arguably strong evidences that the country’s exchange rate policy is 
heading toward a rigid soft US-dollar pegged policy, although as previously 
discussed, the pre-crisis policy was indeed significantly more rigid than that of the 
post-crisis years.  
Having identified those key trends, the objective of our paper is not to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the exchange rate policy of the country. Rather, the 
next question that we hope to address, which arises naturally from the early findings, 
is whether there is any way in which the liquidity benefits from holding reserves may 
be maintained without the need for Indonesia to continue to accumulate them. This is   6
where a regional reserve pooling arrangement becomes relevant. But how might one 
judge the potential size of benefits of reserve pooling? To do so, we need to estimate 
the level of reserves that members would have to hold independently relative to 
pooling reserves (i.e. “hypothetical reserves”). In other words, we need some 
measure of the extent of ”excess reserves” that are generated with pooling of 
reserves. Section 3 therefore evaluates these issues from Indonesia’s perspective if 
it were to participate in a regional reserve pooling with the rest of the East Asia (i.e. 
ASEAN-5 -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore and the North 
Asian economies of Hong Kong, Korea, China and Japan). Such a reserve pool has 
been recently suggested as an important way of enhancing regional monetary 
cooperation and a logical next step in the Chiang Mai swap initiative (Rajan and 
Siregar, 2003 and Rajan, Siregar and Bird, 2003).  
The final section offers a few closing comments on the current 
macroeconomic and financial situation in Indonesia.  
 
2.  Modelling the Behaviour of the Indonesian Rupiah 
2.1   Estimating the Weights of Major Global Currencies 
Assuming that the Indonesian rupiah is managed against a basket of 
currencies, what are the de facto weights of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the UK 
pound sterling and the euro in the Indonesian rupiah’s overall currency basket? This 
section attempts to answer this question. 
For our purpose, the basic regression model employed to test for the 
behaviour of the nominal exchange rate of rupiah during the last eight years (1995-
2003) is based on Frankel and Wei (1994).
6  Consistent with the burgeoning 
literature in this area, we choose a relatively independent currency (Swiss franc) as 
an arbitrary numeraire for measuring nominal exchange rate variations. The 
regression is a multivariate ordinary least square (OLS) -- the percentage changes in 
                                                 
6  See McKinnon, 2001 for a recent application of this technique.   7
the nominal exchange rates of rupiah vis-à-vis the Swiss franc is regressed against 
the percentage changes in the nominal exchange rates of the US dollar, the yen, the 
pound sterling and the euro against the Swiss franc.
7  
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A large and statistically significant coefficient () 2 β  implies that the 
movements of the US dollar strongly influences the fluctuations of the rupiah. A 
similar reasoning applies with regard to the coefficient for the Japanese yen() 3 β , the 
pound sterling () 4 β  and the euro () 5 β . 
To ensure that the test results are robust, we use high frequency weekly 
nominal exchange rate data from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service website                         
(http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/). We divide the observation sets into three sub-
periods: a) the pre-crisis period (November 26, 1995 to June 29, 1997); b) the crisis 
period (July 6, 1997 to December 26, 1999); and c) the post-crisis period (January 1, 
                                                 
7  McKinnon (2001) includes also the German Deutche Mark (DM). The overall conclusion 
however still confirms the significant role of the US dollar, while both the Japanese yen and 
the DM are found to be insignificant during the recovery period (1999 onward).  
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2000 to April 6, 2003). We opt to break the post-1997 period into the crisis and the 
post-crisis/recovery period based on the degrees of volatilities of the local currency 
(as will be elaborated further in the next section).
8 Consideration of these three sub-
periods allows us to compare and contrast the weights of these major world 
currencies in explaining the fluctuations of the nominal rupiah during the pre-1997 
financial crisis, the height of the crisis (1998 and 1999), and the recovery years. Note 
however, given the starting available date for euro only in 1999, we include euro only 
for the last period test ---hence we have two sets of testing: with and without the 
euro. 
The regression results are summarised in Table 4
9. The estimated coefficient 
for the US dollar () 2 β  is the only other significant coefficient for the regression for the 
pre-crisis period (at the 1 percent level). Judged by the adjusted R-square, the 
statistical model successfully explains over 90 percent of the fluctuation of rupiah. 
This confirms that the rupiah was effectively a soft US dollar peg during the pre-crisis 
period.  
Following a series of speculative attacks on regional currencies, the rupiah 
was floated on August 14, 1997. Our test result for the height of the crisis period (July 
6, 1997 to December 26, 1999) captures the outcome of the free floating period. The 
coefficient estimates for the US dollar () 2 β , the yen () 3 β and the pound sterling 
() 4 β are insignificant at the 10 percent level. The significantly larger standard errors 
for the coefficients of the US dollar, the yen and the UK pound sterling during the 
crisis vis-à-vis the pre-crisis period reflect the relatively greater fluctuations of the 
                                                 
8 Other key macroeconomic indicators such as the GDP growth rate and the inflation rate 
have also shown that the Indonesian economy only started to experience a stable recovery in 
early 2000 (Siregar (2001)). 
 
9  Before conducting the OLS regression on Eq. (1) we employed the ADF and the KPSS 
Unit-Root test to evaluate the time series properties of the relevant data. The results confirm 
that all of the percentage changes in nominal exchange rates are I (0). Hence, the OLS test 
ought to be adequate in this case. For the sake of brevity, the unit-root test results are not 
included in the paper but are available on request.  
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rupiah against these industrial countries currencies during the height of the crisis. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R-square is only around 2 percent, further reflecting the 
overall poor regression fit. This is confirmation that the period immediately following 
the breakdown of the peg and loss of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor was 
one of virtual free floating. 
Interestingly, the regression result for the post-crisis period is suggestive of a 
growing influence of the US dollar fluctuations on the rupiah. Unlike the pre-crisis 
case, however, the Japanese yen also appears to have influenced the movement of 
rupiah during the post-crisis period (January 1, 2000 to April 6, 2003). These findings 
further confirm the finding by McKinnon (2001)
10. 
Although the coefficient estimates for both the US dollar and the Japanese 
yen are statistically significant, the former () 2 β  is significant at even the 1 percent 
critical level, while the latter is () 3 β  significant at only the 5 percent. The relative 
prominence of the US dollar in the Indonesian currency basket relative to the 
Japanese yen during the post-crisis period is also reflected by the relative sizes of 
the individual coefficient estimates. Specifically, the post-crisis period coefficient 
estimate for () 2 β  is 0.573. This is substantially larger than that for () 3 β  estimated at 
0.333. It is important to note that although the size of the post-crisis coefficient for the 
US dollar has risen compared to the second sub-period, it is still considerably lower 
than its pre-crisis level. While the goodness-of-fit as measured by the adjusted R-
squared has increased significantly in the post crisis period, it is only around 23 
percent, far lower than during the crisis period.  
To further compare the degree of fixity to the US dollar during the pre-and 
post-crisis, we adopt a hypothesis test used by McKinnon (2001). 
 
                                                 
10 There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some East Asian economies have 
reverted to soft US dollar pegs     10
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Note: SE is the standard error. 
From the test results summarised in Table 4, we find the H-stat to be around 
2.303, hence suggesting that the post-crisis fixity to the US dollar was much loser 
than the pre-crisis period.  
When we add the euro into the regression testing, the result does not change 
much for the US dollar. The coefficient estimate for () 2 β  remains significant at 1 
percent level. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates for the rest of the world 
currencies are insignificant, including that of the Japanese yen. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the euro actually worsens the R-square.   
In summary, while there is a relatively higher degree of flexibility of the 
Indonesian rupiah in comparison to the pre-crisis period, the importance of the US 
dollar in explaining the movements of the rupiah has increased in recent years. This 
conclusion is fully consistent with other studies (for instance, see Hernandez and 
Montiel, 2001, Kawaii and Takagi, 2000 and McKinnon, 2001).   
 
2.2  Estimating the Volatilities of Rupiah vis-à-vis the US Dollar 
To further examine the behaviour of the local currency we complement the 
foregoing regression analysis by estimating the changes in the volatility rate of the 
rupiah during the period under consideration. For the purpose of modeling the week-
to-week volatility of nominal exchange rates of rupiah against the US dollar, we 
employ the Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticicty (GARCH   11
(1,1)) model which is based on the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) family of statistical models.  
The GARCH (1,1) specification that we consider takes the following form: 
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NER represents the weekly nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US 
dollar from November 26, 1995 to April 6, 2003 (Figure 1). The conditional variance 
equation (Eq. 4) described above is a function of three terms: a) the mean α ; b) 
news about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of the squared 
residual from the mean equation: 
2
1 − t e  (the ARCH  term); and c) the last period’s 
forecast error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH term). We have also included a dummy 
variable to capture the crisis period and the shift in the exchange rate policy. The 
dummy is set to 0 up to July 20, 1997 and 1 from July 27, 1997 to April 6, 2003.   
We estimated different types of ARCH models such as ARCH, GARCH and 
EGARCH models. The best results are found to be GARCH (1,1) (Table 5). All of the 
coefficient estimates  γ β α , , (  and  ) δ  are significant at the 1 percent level. The 
positive and significant coefficient estimate for the crisis dummy implies the 
conditional variance (or the volatility index),  t h , has increased due to the 
uncertainties associated with the crisis. Several noteworthy findings bear highlighting 
(Figure 2 and Table 5b). 
Following the period of relative stability during the pre-crisis period, the 
conditional variance of rupiah jumped by more than 290 times during the crisis (July 
27, 1997 to December 26, 1999) period vis-à-vis the average for the pre-crisis   12
(November 26, 1995 to July 20, 1997). The speculative attacks at the peak of the 
crisis and the adoption of the “temporary” free-floating regime and consequent loss of 
the nominal anchor consequently brought about an unprecedented level of volatility 
of the rupiah in 1998 and 1999. Socio-political uncertainties, marked by the downfall 
of the Suharto regime in early 1998, as well as inconsistent and incoherent 
macroeconomic policies obviously contributed significantly to the volatility of rupiah 
(Soesastro and Basri, 1998 and Johnson, 1998).  
The return of some degree of stability in rupiah against the US dollar started 
to be felt from 2000 onwards. The average post-crisis volatility rate (January 2, 2000 
to April 6, 2003) is estimated at only around 14 percent of the reported rate during 
the height of the crisis (July 27, 1997 to December 26, 1999). Furthermore, the mean 
and the standard deviation of the weekly volatility of the bilateral nominal rupiah 
against the US dollar from 2001 to 2003 dropped steadily (Table 5b). The declining 
volatility patterns of the rupiah against the US dollar is yet further evidence of the 
possible reversion to a soft US dollar pegged regime in Indonesia. The test results 
also seem to cast doubt about official claims that the rupiah is managed under a 
floating-cum inflation target regime. This said, we hasten to caution against drawing 
too definite a conclusion, as an pen economy inflation target could always be defined 
to be sufficiently “flexible” such that the exchange rate takes on a significantly high 
weight in the monetary policy objective function (for instance, see Cavoli and Rajan, 
2003 and Eichengreen, 2001)
11.  
 
3.  Assessing the Size and Benefits of a Reserve Pool 
One of the consequences of reversion to a soft dollar peg is the need to hold 
a substantial amount of international reserves. As noted, stockpiling of reserves is 
                                                 
11 This is turn leads to the important question of how one might distinguish between a 
sufficiently flexible inflating target and a currency basket regime a la Williamson (1999a,b).  
   13
especially critical in this era of open capital markets as a means of safeguarding 
against capital account crises. As Fischer (2001) notes: 
Reserves matter because they are a key determinant of a country's 
ability to avoid economic and financial crisis. This is true of all 
countries, but especially of emerging markets open to volatile 
international capital flows…The availability of capital flows to offset 
current account shocks should, on the face of it, reduce the amount of 
reserves a country needs. But access to private capital is often 
uncertain, and inflows are subject to rapid reversals, as we have seen 
all too often in recent years. We have also seen in the recent crises 
that countries that had big reserves by and large did better in 
withstanding contagion than those with smaller reserves.. (pp.1-3). 
 
However, reserve hoarding involves significant opportunity costs as the 
country is essentially swapping high yielding domestic assets for relatively lower 
yielding foreign ones (Bird and Rajan, 2003). It has often been suggested that these 
costs might be reduced with a greater degree of regional monetary cooperation. The 
modalities and institutional arrangements needed for a reserve pooling arrangement 
have been detailed by Medhora (1992 a and b) and Rajan and Siregar (2003). These 
papers have suggested two -- highly imperfect but practical -- ways of estimating the 
benefits of a reserve pool. The first is a simple import-based one, while the second 
takes into account some measure of the level of reserve variability.  
The more conventional import-based measurement considers the adequacy 
of reserve holdings by the monetary authority by the number of weeks / imports that 
they can pay for. It has been well argued however that although the reserve to import 
ratio is considered a reasonable measure, but it is highly imperfect (Bird and Rajan 
(2003)).  There are obvious limitations of using imports as a scaling factor for 
determining reserve adequacy. Crises of the 1990s and beyond that have afflicted 
many middle-income developing countries have predominantly been crises of the 
capital account (Rajan, 2003). Reserve adequacy benchmarks accordingly need to 
be modified to allow for both imports and capital outflows as potential drains on 
reserves (Bird and Rajan, 2003 and Reddy, 2002). For instance, the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) states:    14
(W)ith the changing profile of capital flows, the traditional approach of 
assessing reserve adequacy in terms of import cover has been 
broadened to include a number of parameters which take into account 
the size, composition, and risk profiles of various types of capital flows 
as well as the types of external shocks to which the economy is 
vulnerable (Reddy, 2002, p.6). 
 
Hence, for this paper we consider only the latter measure, i.e. based on the 
reserve variability level. The details of this measure are presented next. 
 
3.1    Coverage Index 
Since international reserve holdings have been found to be a theoretically and 
statistically significant determinant of creditworthiness (see De Beaufort Wijnholds 
and Kapteyn, 2001 and references cited within), depleting them as a way of 
cushioning the effect of capital outflows on the exchange rate may make matters 
worse by inducing further capital outflows. If capital outflows reflect a perception 
within private capital markets that a country is illiquid, reducing international reserves 
and therefore curbing liquidity further in a financially fragile environment is unlikely to 
be an effective strategy.  As noted by Reddy (2002): 
There is a tendency among the analysts and media to react negatively 
to erosion in a more intensive way and positively to addition to 
reserves in a less intensive way.  A higher level of reserves may 
possibly give greater scope for changes by making them appear 
marginal (p.10). 
 
    
Consistent on this general view, it has long been argued that one of the more 
appropriate ways of measuring international reserve adequacy is to compare 
average reserve holdings to their variability (Medhora, 1992a,b and Williams et al., 




Ci =       ( 5 )  
   15
where:  PR is the average level of reserve holdings (or access to reserves) during a 
time period,  ) (PR Var is their variability during the same period
12.  
 
3.2  Reserve Pooling Based on Variability of Reserves  
If we start with this general view that variability of reserves, as a proxy for risk, 
is indeed undesirable. Thus, a scheme that brings about potentially smaller 
variability, and yet at the same time offers at the least the same degree of protection 
against market risks is desired. In accord with that analysis, the so-called reserve 
coverage index (equation 5) encompasses two potential avenues for any country (i) 
to increase its coverage. The first is through an increase in average reserve holdings 
(or access to more reserves), while the second is by reducing its variability. 
How is this related to a reserve pool? Medhora (1992b) observes: 
By belonging to the reserve pool, the member countries have…access to the 
others’ reserve during times of need. At the same time, by pooling, each 
country is taking on the variability of the entire pool, rather than just the 
variability of its own reserves (p.213).  
 
In short, the pooling of reserves offers participating countries an access to higher and 
less volatile foreign exchange reserves. Each individual country may consider either 
a full or partial pool, whereby they can each access all its own reserves as well as 
the partially pooled reserves of all the other members. The coverage index for the 
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12 Variability of PR is represented by the standard deviation of the reserve during a specified 
time period.   16
where: p is the degree of pooling  ) 1 0 ( ≤ ≤ p  and  i R and  j R  are the total reserves of 
country  i and j  (the members of the pool).  Naturally,  ) 0 ( = p  implies no pooling, 
while   ) 1 ( = p  captures a 100% pooling scheme.   
  From Eqs. 5 and 6, it is clear that the coverage under reserve pooling will be 
higher than that in the autonomous state if the variability of the pool is lower than that 
of each country’s reserves separately, or if the increased access to the larger pool of 
reserves outweighs the higher variability of the pooled reserves. The formulation of 
the pooled-coverage index assumes each country has unrestricted access to the 
pool. When one country draws down the pool, it reduces coverage for the other 
member countries. Hence, the pooled system is a zero sum game.  
 
3.3  Estimating Potential Benefits From Pooling 
The gains and losses from pooling can be quantified by examining the 
hypothetical scenario of “what if each country had wanted to maintain the level of 
coverage that it actually enjoyed from the pooling arrangement, but did not belong to 
the pool” (Medhora, 1992b, p.217).  
The hypothetical reserve is calculated as follows: 
 
) ( * i i i R Var C HR =        ( 7 )  
 
i HR  is the hypothetical reserve -- the level of reserves that each country would have 
had to hold had it not belonged to the pool, but still wanted to maintain the coverage 
actually afforded by the pool.  i C  is the coverage index of country iunder the pooling, 
and  ) ( i R Var is the variability of country i’s own reserves. The gains/losses from 
reserve pooling may be measured as follows: 
   17
PR HR L G − = /        ( 8 )  
 
where:  ) / ( L G is the gain (+) or loss (-) in international reserve levels. HR and PR are 
the hypothetical and actual average foreign exchange reserves, respectively. 
  Table 6 reports the average quarterly reserve holdings for Indonesia and its 
variability from the last quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 2002
13. Based on this 
data, we first compute the coverage index without pooling (0 percent) and simulate 
the country’s coverage index by imposing an additional 10 percent level of pooling 
commitment at each stage (from 10 percent pooling to 100 percent pooling). As 
shown in Table 6, the highest coverage index for Indonesia can be attained if the 
country commits to 20 percent pooling
14 
Without pooling, the coverage index for Indonesia is at around 3.07. 
Indonesia enjoys the highest coverage (3.15) if its pools 20 percent of its reserves. In 
such a case, the reserve pooling arrangement generates excess reserves of around 
US$539 million. But what are the fiscal costs of holding the “excess” reserves?  
Strictly speaking, the true opportunity cost of holding international reserves is 
the difference between the marginal product of capital (MPK) and the yield on foreign 
interest rates on liquid assets to estimate the fiscal costs (Kenen and Yudin, 1965).  
Since accurate and timely information on the MPK in Indonesia is not easily 
available, we compute the fiscal costs (FC) as follows: 
 
( ) ER NER FC
USA IND * int int ∆ − − =        ( 9 )  
 
                                                 
13 The initial period of last quarter 1993 was selected due to the availability of the foreign 
exchange reserve holding data for a selected number of countries from the IFS CD-ROM, 
IMF. 
 
14 This 20 percent figure is specific to Indonesia. It varies for other countries individually and 
for the whole group. See Rajan and Siregar (2003) and Rajan, Siregar and Bird (2003) for 
detailed discussions.   18
where: ) (FC   is the estimated fiscal cost.  ) (int
IND  is the yearly average of the 3 
month SBI (certificate of Bank Indonesia) rate.  ) (int
USA is the equivalent annual 
average of the US three month treasury bill rate.  NER ∆  is the annual average of the 
change of the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US dollar.  We obtain t-bill 
interest rate and the nominal exchange rate data from the IFS CD-ROM
15, and the 3-
month SBI rate from the database of Bank Indonesia. To generate a better proxy of 
the average annual interest rate differentials (adjusted by the change in the nominal 
exchange rate) and to avoid structural breaks in the series during the height of the 
crisis, we excluded data for the peak of the crisis period (1998 and 1999) from the 
calculation.   
The average interest rate in Indonesia is slightly above 5 percent premium 
over the equivalent US rate.
16 This translates to slightly over US$ 28 million of an 
annual average fiscal cost that Indonesia had to incur during the period examined. It 
is important to note here however that the results summarized in Table 6 are likely to 
undercount the true fiscal cost as the cost of the financial capital in Indonesia 
(reflected here by the SBI rate) far lower than the marginal cost of capital. 
 
4.  Concluding Comments: Current Macroeconomic and Financial Situation 
in Indonesia  
 
Although both fiscal and external vulnerabilities continue to decline in 
Indonesia, financing of economic recovery remains extremely precarious. As shown 
                                                 
15 We assume for simplicity that the bulk of East Asian reserves is held in US dollars. This is 
probably not too far from reality. In 1999, 78 percent of global international reserves were in 
US dollars (D’Arista, 2000). Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) offer a recent discussion on 
the currency composition of international reserves. 
 
16  Rajan, Siregar and Sugema calculated the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) of three-month 
commercial deposit rate of the Southeast Asian economies (including Indonesia) against that 
of the US, Japan, the UK, Germany and France between 1991- 1997. For Indonesia, the UIP 
spreads were ranging between 2 percent to 3 percent against these economies, except for 
Japan (the rate was close to 6 percent) per each three-month maturity term. This implies that 
the annual average spread ranged from 8 percent to 12 percent. Against the US rate, the 
study reports a slightly over 8 percent spread.      19
in this paper, pooling of reserves with other East Asian economies may be a means 
by which Indonesia and other regional economies are able to generate the much-
needed extra financial resources to aid development. There are important political 
economy questions involved with regard to how to make creditor countries in the 
region (such as Korea and Singapore) join such a reserve pool. While some of these 
issues are analyse in Rajan and Siregar (2003), suffice it to note here the following 
observation by Medhora (1992b) about the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU)
17: 
Pooling has not benefited all members equally…(However)...the 
evidence of asymmetry in the gains (and, indeed the existence of 
losses from some countries) could be viewed as a sign that the 
system is working. The very basis of belonging to a reserve pool, or, 
for that matter, the monetary union, is to provide benefits to others in 
the knowledge that at other times, they will do the same for 
you…Belonging to a monetary union involves buying a package so 
that gains or losses in one aspect of the deal must be seen in the 
larger context of the arrangement…The lesson for 
other(s)...contemplating such an arrangement…is that reserve pooling 
works best when couched among other features of regional monetary 
integration.      
                                                 
17 The WAEMU, established in 1994, consists of eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.   20
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Table 1: Official Exchange Rate Arrangements 
 












Table 2: Rupiah Intervention 
 

















      
Total Amount of Outstanding SBI for Rupiah Intervention in the Market 


















Note: Data for 1998 is not available. 





Table 3: Average Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(Gross International Reserves Less Gold) 
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Quarter 2, 1997- 
Quarter 4, 1999 
 
Post-Crisis: 
Quarter 1, 2000- 









Source: IFS-CD Rom, IMF and Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 4: Regressions Results 












































































































































*    significant at 10 percent level. 
**   significant at 5 percent level. 
***  significant at 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
Table 5: Volatility of Nominal Exchange Rate of Rupiah against the US dollar 





















*   significant at 10 percent level.  
**  significant at 5 percent level. 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation.   25
 
Table 5b: Average Weekly Conditional Variance of GARCH (1,1) 
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Table 6: Reserve, Coverage Index and Fiscal Cost 

































































a) The largest coverage index for Indonesia can be attained when the country commits to 20 percent 
pooling. The pooling includes ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore), 
Korea, China, Hong Kong and Japan. 
b) The hypothetical reserve is calculated for the 20 percent pooling. 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation.   26
Figure 1: Weekly Nominal Exchange Rate of Rupiah against the US dollar 
November 26, 1995 – April 6, 2003 
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Figure 2: Weekly GARCH (1,1) volatility index of rupiah 
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